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SUMMARY 
This article points out particular economic factors and policies which 
influence the level of employment/unemployment in selected Western 
and Eastern European EU member-countries. Their respective growth 
performance in the last decade is taken into consideration too. It 
sheds light on some of the myths related to labour-market success 
and failure by looking at the specific features present in the investi-
gated countries. Through the analysis of indicators related to em-
ployment, unemployment and macroeconomy, we identify characteris-
tic conditions which have been crucial for labour-market performance 
across Europe. 
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INTRODUCTION* 
The European Union is the leading eco-
nomic entity in the world: in terms of 
overall GDP, the EU 27 is ahead of the 
US, and much bigger than China and Ja-
pan. But the EU has not yet succeeded in 
setting the pace for growth, innovation and 
employment in a global comparison. In-
deed, the opposite applies: the EU is more 
often perceived as a counter-reaction to 
globalization (Giddens 1999:124), and, wor-
ryingly, only as a slow and hesitant one. 
According to the Lisbon Strategy, the EU – 
facing the increasing competition from the 
USA and Asia (European Commission High 
Level Group 2004) – has agreed on the 
aim to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion (Lisbon European 
Council 2000). Although the European Un-
ion is lately experiencing relative economic 
stability as a result of an increasingly co-
herent monetary policy, there are still is-
sues of great concern. Structural problems, 
lower economic growth and high levels of 
unemployment, especially after the 2004 
enlargement, affect the EU’s ability to cope 
with forthcoming challenges. European so-
cieties seem to feel fear for globalization 
and perceive it as a reason for higher un-
employment, deindustrialization, sinking 
wages, etc. In an effort to cope, the im-
plementation of the Lisbon Strategy was 
put forward. The EU thereby plans, inter 
alia, to achieve knowledge-based full em-
ployment, which will help improve its com-
                                                 
* The authors, Iwona Mertin (Aalborg University, 
Denmark and The Poznan University of Economics, 
Poland) and Ognian N. Hishow (German Institute 
for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Ger-
many) would like to thank Roderick Parkes, M.A., 
for valuable support. 
petitiveness.1 This is not a utopia: some of 
the EU member-states have been successful 
in the field of labour-market policy for a 
relatively long time. Conversely, some have 
not found their way to reach equilibrium 
yet, i.e. employment rates close to the level 
of full employment. 
But what policies are sustainable in ef-
forts to increase employment or even to 
achieve full employment? Both politicians 
and voters often see only one side of the 
problem and try to decrease the unem-
ployment rate to a minimum level at any 
price in order to avoid social unrest. How-
ever, this short-sighted approach might 
have a negative impact on the economic 
condition of a country. First of all, there is 
no universal model of industrial or social 
relations which could assure the success of 
the labour market. Although, presented in 
this way, this statement may sound platitu-
dinous, lessons are frequently drawn from 
a ‘successful’ member state and offered as 
a panacea for the EU 27. Second, the 
analysis shows that there is no correlation 
between the size of the country and its 
employment situation. It is frequently but 
wrongly assumed that smaller countries 
adjust better to changing conditions and 
act efficient, as they are more determinant 
in their actions (Auer 2000, Katzenstein 
1985). Finally, high social-protection expen-
ditures are no explanation for high inactiv-
ity rates, nor are they the cause of unem-
ployment. To stress the point, a better la-
bour-market situation is not dependent on 
the existence of low-level social protection. 
The solution for reaching a stable equi-
librium of relatively high employment in 
the labour area is the subtle combination 
of labour-market policy, macroeconomic 
policy and social dialogue. Each of the 
                                                 
1 European Employment Strategy, until 2010: Total 
employment rate – Employed persons aged 15-64 as 
a share of the total population of the same age 
group = 70 per cent; Employment rate – females – 
Employed women aged 15-64 as a share of the 
total female population of the same age group = 
60 per cent; Total employment rate of older work-
ers – Employed persons aged 55-64 as a share of 
the total population of the same age group = 50 
per cent; regards the EU 15. 
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countries in the EU 25 has its characteris-
tic features that push it towards success or 
failure. In order to present these charac-
teristics specific states have been selected 
for analysis, and some categorization of 
their common features has been made. As 
a result we have 5 groups containing 12 
countries: 
∗ Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden),  
∗ Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and the 
UK), 
∗ Continental countries (France, Germany 
and the Netherlands), 
∗ South European countries (Portugal) 
as representatives of different social models 
(Sapir 2006:376) in Europe and addition-
ally 
∗ Central and Eastern European countries 
(the Czech Republic, the Slovak Repub-
lic, Hungary and Poland). 
These selected countries offer a wide 
range of features for analysis. On the one 
hand, there is Denmark, a small and open 
economy that has relative advantage when 
the high share of part-time job or the high 
level of employment among young people 
is considered. On the other hand, there 
are representatives of Central and Eastern 
Europe, like Slovakia and Poland. Poland 
has not only a poor level of social protec-
tion and a low level of development in ac-
tive labour-market measures, but is also 
facing the highest level of unemployment in 
the whole European Union. Similarly, Ger-
many and France – known for their etatist 
stance – and the UK, more liberal, also 
perform differently, despite their common 
size. 
1) LABOUR MARKET IN 
EUROPE. EMPLOYMENT, 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
INACTIVITY CHARACTERISTICS 
1.1. Employment situation in gen-
eral and by gender 
The situation among the countries selected 
for analysis and within the EU 25 as a 
whole is diverse. When the EU 25 average 
is considered, there are two groups of 
countries. One, represented by Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and France, where em-
ployment rates are below the EU 25 aver-
age, and another with rates above the av-
erage, consisting of the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. For the time being, only four of 
the researched countries – Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United King-
dom – already fulfil the goals of the 
European Employment Strategy for 2010 
with regards to total employment rates. 
Portugal and Ireland are close to the en-
visaged level of 70 per cent.  
Employment rates are not static and it 
is crucial to examine them over a period 
of time. There are three countries where a 
downward tendency is visible: the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Poland. Poland has 
experienced the highest decrease of em-
ployment rate since 1998 among the se-
lected member-states for analysis. Employ-
ment expanded the most in Ireland, by 7 
percentage points. Between 1998 and 2005 
rank orders have not changed significantly. 
In the first place there is Denmark, in the 
last, Poland (the latter has replaced Hun-
gary). The greatest progress has been 
made by the Netherlands and Ireland. 
When the growth rate of this indicator is 
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considered, the first impression is that the 
Central Eastern European countries have 
the poorest results. (Table 1) 
The division into gender in two points 
of time, namely in 1998 and in 2005 re-
veals that Ireland has had the highest em-
ployment-growth rate among both women 
and men. Moreover, it corresponds with 
the highest growth rate of total employ-
ment. Data also show that many countries 
are trying to expand the access of women 
to the labour market, which is a result of 
following the early implemented guidelines 
for national employment policy (Action 
Programs against Unemployment 1993). All 
countries, except Poland, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic, have increased the share 
of female labour force in the market. Pol-
ish women have the most difficult situation 
– they have experienced the highest decline 
in employment (4.9 percentage points). The 
leaders are Denmark, Sweden (around 70 
per cent), the Netherlands and the UK. Ire-
land has made the biggest progress, while 
Hungary has been replaced by Poland in 
the last place. The male share of the la-
bour market has lately gone through more 
dramatic changes. Apart from Ireland, 
France, Sweden, Hungary and the UK have 
all noticed an increase in male employ-
ment. In the other countries this indicator 
has fallen, most remarkably in Poland (7.6 
percentage points), in Slovakia (3.2), in the 
Czech Republic (2.7) and in Portugal (2.5). 
1.2. Unemployment by country, age 
and gender 
While in the EU 25 the unemployment rate 
has declined from 9.4 per cent in 1998 to 
8.8 per cent in 2005, some of the individ-
ual member-states were not able to follow 
this broad trend. There has been a signifi-
cant increase of unemployment in the Slo-
vak Republic (3.7 percentage points) and 
Poland (7.5 percentage points). The nega-
tive tendency has also appeared in Ger-
many, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic 
and Portugal. Ireland took a winning posi-
tion in this aspect with its decrease of un-
employment by 3.2 percentage points (Ta-
ble 2). The rest of the countries, including 
both Nordic countries, France, the UK and 
Hungary, have also observed slight declines 
in unemployment rates. Changes within this 
indicator seem to point out the weakest 
parts of Europe, which are the South and 
Table 1
Employment rates 
(Employed persons aged 15–64 as a share of the total population of the same age group) 
 
1998 2005 Change 1998 2005 Change 1998 2005 Change  
Total Women Men 
EU 25 61.2 63.8 2.6 51.8 56.3 4.5 70.6 71.3 0.7 
Czech Republic 67.3 64.8 -2.5 58.7 56.3 -2.4 76.0 73.3 -2.7 
Denmark 75.1 75.9 0.8 70.2 71.9 1.7 79.9 79.8 -0.1 
Germany 63.9 65.4 1.5 55.8 59.6 3.8 71.9 71.2 -0.7 
Hungary 53.7 56.9 3.2 47.2 51.0 3.8 60.5 63.1 2.6 
France 60.2 63.1 2.9 53.1 57.6 4.5 67.4 68.8 1.4 
Ireland 60.6 67.6 7.0 49.0 58.3 9.3 72.1 76.9 4.8 
Netherlands 70.2 73.2 3.0 60.1 66.4 6.3 80.2 79.9 -0.3 
Poland 59.0 52.8 -6.2 51.7 46.8 -4.9 66.5 58.9 -7.6 
Portugal 66.8 67.5 0.7 58.2 61.7 3.5 75.9 73.4 -2.5 
Slovakia 60.6 57.7 -2.9 53.5 50.9 -2.6 67.8 64.6 -3.2 
Sweden 70.3 72.5 2.2 67.9 70.4 2.5 72.8 74.4 1.6 
United Kingdom 70.5 71.7 1.2 63.6 65.9 2.3 77.3 77.6 0.3 
Source: Eurostat 
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the East. What is here worth highlighting 
however, is the fact that, although the offi-
cial Swedish unemployment rate is around 
8 per cent, the unofficial one is said to be 
even around 20 per cent2 (Larson 2006:3). 
Taking the unemployment rate itself into 
consideration, the highest is in Poland (over 
17 per cent). This country has been suffer-
ing not only from the highest growth in 
unemployment rates but also from the 
highest amount of unemployed. Ireland, 
                                                 
2 Although the official unemployment rate is now 
above 8 per cent, the employment rate (those em-
ployed as a share of the working age population) 
has not changed since the days of double-digit un-
employment. The average employment rate over the 
past decade is 70.5 per cent. The share of 20-64 
year olds choosing to drop out of the work force 
has been equally stable, averaging 18.5 per cent 
over the same period. It is not easy to determine 
the true level of unemployment in Sweden. Official 
accounts places it in the lower end of the EU, but 
one has to keep in mind that Sweden has a long 
history of the so-called active labour-market pro-
grams. It is highly contested whether or not these 
programs generate employment for their enrollers 
and whether or not they have any effect at all on 
the labour market itself. Estimates usually put total 
Swedish unemployment, including the so-called hid-
den unemployment, at somewhere between 15 and 
20 per cent, about three times above the official 
unemployment figures. (...) about 20 to 25 per cent 
of the work force is unemployed and that most of 
them are “stashed away” in the statistics on long-
term sick leave, in labour-market programs, or in 
early-retirement and similar programs (Larson 
2006). 
Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands 
have the lowest unemployment levels. All 
these countries – except the last – have 
lately managed to decrease their unem-
ployment. From the Western European 
countries, in the worst position is France 
alongside Germany. In both countries the 
level of unemployment is near 10 per cent, 
while in Germany it is barely falling. In 
1998, the Netherlands had the lowest un-
employment rate and Slovakia the highest. 
After seven years, rank orders have 
changed significantly. There is Ireland, 
which has made great progress moving 
from 6th to 1st place. Countries like Den-
mark, the Netherlands, the UK and Portu-
gal have changed their places within 2nd 
and 4th ranks. The rest have made modest 
changes. The last rank in 2005 belongs to 
Poland, preceded by Slovakia. 
The analytical distinction made between 
males and females reflects once more that 
Poland has the worst labour-market condi-
tions. Between 1998 and 2005 the female 
unemployment rate has risen about 7 per-
centage points and male unemployment 8 
percentage points. Ireland and the Nether-
lands put in the best performance.3 
                                                 
3 Especially the Nehterlands in 1998. 
Table 2
Unemployment rates 
(Unemployed persons aged 15–64 as a share of the total active population) 
 
1998 2005 Change 1998 2005 Change 1998 2005 Change
 
Total Women Men 
EU 25 9.4 8.8 -0.6 11.2 9.9 -1.3 8.0 7.9 -0.1 
Czech Republic 6.4 7.9 1.5 8.1 9.8 1.7 5.0 6.5 1.5 
Denmark 4.9 4.8 -0.1 6.0 5.3 -0.7 3.9 4.4 0.5 
Germany 8.8 9.5 0.7 11.1 10.3 -0.8 7.1 8.9 1.8 
Hungary 8.4 7.2 -1.2 7.8 7.4 -0.4 9.0 7.0 -2.0 
France 11.1 9.7 -1.4 12.9 10.8 -2.1 9.5 8.8 -0.7 
Ireland 7.5 4.3 -3.2 7.3 4.0 -3.3 7.7 4.6 -3.1 
Netherlands 3.8 4.7 0.9 5.0 5.1 0.1 3.0 4.4 1.4 
Poland 10.2 17.7 7.5 12.2 19.1 6.9 8.5 16.6 8.1 
Portugal 5.1 7.6 2.5 6.3 8.7 2.4 4.1 6.7 2.6 
Slovakia 12.6 16.3 3.7 13.1 17.2 4.1 12.2 15.5 3.3 
Sweden 8.2 7.8 -0.4 8.0 7.7 -0.3 8.4 7.9 -0.5 
United Kingdom 6.1 4.7 -1.4 5.3 4.3 -1.0 6.8 5.1 -1.7 
Source: Eurostat 
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1.3. Inactivity rates vary across 
Europe  
The next indicator that needs analyzing is 
inactivity rate. The inactivity rate is defined 
as the percentage of the population that is 
neither working nor seeking work, so it is 
not in the labour force (International La-
bour Office). This indicator shows what 
part of the workforce remains outside of 
the labour market and for which reasons. 
The limited availability of data obliges a 
focus on recent years for the sake of reli-
ability. 
Since 2000, the level of inactivity was 
the lowest in countries from the Nordic 
Group and the Netherlands. While Den-
mark seems to have an advantage regard-
ing the lowest inactivity rate in its popula-
tion as a whole and among women, the 
Netherlands is especially successful when 
the inactivity rate of men is considered, 
though with a negative trend of this rate. 
The greatest winner in this case is again 
Ireland. In last place is Hungary. There 
not only the inactivity rate for the whole 
population but also that separately meas-
ured for women and men belong to the 
highest among the investigated countries. 
(Figure 1) 
2) THE ECONOMY IN THE 
MEDIUM RUN AND THE LABOUR 
MARKET 
In the EU member-states there is an ob-
servable correlation between the perform-
ance of the economy and the performance 
of the labour market, and vice versa. 
Changes in employment do affect growth 
and this influence works as a sort of 
feedback also the other way round.  
Crucially for the EU, changes in the age 
structure of the population can affect la-
bour input. Specifically, if a population de-
cline takes place in Europe, the labour 
force may stagnate or shrink. The outcome 
will be, other things unchanged, a decline 
in capital intensity, and a falling standard 
of living. However, if the inactivity rate is 
successfully reduced, income and capital 
per capita can stay stable as if there was 
population growth – at least for a while.  
Finally, there is a linkage between vari-
ous macroeconomic policies and the shape 
of the labour market. While monetary pol-
icy affects the demand side of the econ-
omy, wage bargaining mechanism as a tool 
of
Figure 1 
Inactive population aged 15–64 as a percentage of the total population 
(fourth quarter data) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
HU PL IE FR SK DE CZ PT UK NL SE DK
2000 2005
 
Source: Eurostat 
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adjustment is addressing the supply 
side. Fiscal policy is of major im-
portance too, because especially tax 
burden and tax rates may affect 
employment and output level. 
In the following sections we will 
discuss those relations, bearing in 
mind both theory and practice. 
2.1. Economic growth vs. 
employment 
Growth theories attribute output 
growth mainly to the input of three 
factors:4 
∗ labour growth times the share 
of this input in income, 
∗ capital growth times the share 
of this input in income, 
∗ technical progress/growth of to-
tal factor productivity.5 
In principle, the more people 
there are in the labour force, the 
more goods and services are pro-
vided. However, since WWII, em-
ployment growth has been losing 
importance as a source of produc-
tivity growth. The increasing role of 
innovation and improving qualifica-
tions among employees are lately 
the steering factors of economic 
growth. There is a growing need 
for human-capital development, 
which directly affects labour pro-
ductivity. Labour productivity is the 
main factor of output growth, be-
ing at the same time the basis for 
the growth of society’s welfare. 
                                                 
4 According to the growth accounting equation: 
∆Y/Y=[(1-α)∆N/N] + (α∆K/K) + ∆A/A, where Y is 
the output, A is the level of technology/productivity, 
K is capital, N is labour, (1-α) and α are weights 
equal to labour’s and capital’s share of income. 
5 The amount by which output would increase as a 
result of improvements in methods of production, 
with all inputs unchanged (Solow 1957:312–320). 
In Ireland the high average annual 
growth rate in GDP between 1990 and 
2005 corresponded with both high produc-
tivity and employment growth (Figure 2 
and 3). The Netherlands has also followed 
this approach, although not reaching such 
astonishing effects regarding GDP growth 
as Irish economy. Other countries repre-
Figure 2 
Relation between employment growth and GDP growth, 
1990–2005 
(annual average growth rates)* 
* For employment-growth data from 1991–2005 (IE 1991–2005; 
DK, DE, FR, NL, SE 1992–2005; UK 1993–2005; CZ, SK 1995–
2005; PL, HU 1996–2005; PT 1999–2005), GDP growth 1990–
2004 (for HU and SK 1995–2004). 
Source: Eurostat, DG ECFIN, European Economy, Spring 2004, 
OECD Productivity Database, September 2006. 
Figure 3 
Relation between GDP growth per hour worked/labour-
productivity growth*, 1990–2005** and GDP growth 
(annual average growth rates) 
* It grows as a result of technical progress and because of the 
accumulation of capital per worker. 
** Productivity for CZ, HU and SK data from period 1995–
2004, for PL 2000–2005. GDP growth 1990–2004 (for HU and 
SK 1995–2004). 
Source: Eurostat, DG ECFIN, European Economy, Spring 2004, 
OECD Productivity Database, September 2006. 
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sented far modest employment-growth 
rates, rather basing their growth on in-
creasing productivity.6 
When comparing the indicators from 
2005, it can be noted that there are two 
patterns of economic growth. One has its 
roots in increasing productivity whilst the 
other is based on higher levels of job crea-
tion. According to the data, three sets of 
countries can roughly be identified: 
∗ predominantly employment-driven eco-
nomic growth: Ireland; 
∗ predominantly productivity-driven eco-
nomic growth: Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hun-
gary; 
∗ between these two poles: Denmark and 
the UK have similar results for both fac-
tors, so they are moving towards eco-
nomic growth both through productivity 
and employment growth. 
Some countries have increased their lev-
els of productivity per hour as a conse-
quence of a reduction of average working 
time (CZ, FR, PL and SE). Moreover, in the 
case of the Czech Republic, labour-
productivity growth is in general focused 
on industry, transport and public services 
(Podkaminer, Stehrer 2006:140).  
Regarding economic growth, one more 
fact can be noticed. Countries from Eastern 
Europe have predominantly higher GDP-
per-capita growth than the Western coun-
tries. This difference is estimated at 1.8 per 
cent to 2 per cent per year, will be main-
tained at least until 20157 and is perceived 
as a prerequisite for catching-up with the 
EU 15. 
                                                 
6 Sweden between 1992 and 2005 and Slovakia 
between 1995 and 2005 have even noticed declines 
within annual unweighted average employment 
growth. 
7 For more, see Maddison 2002, Podkaminer and 
Hunya 2005. 
2.2. Population growth and the 
ageing-society phenomenon 
Output growth depends on labour growth, 
on capital growth and on the speed of 
technical progress. In per-capita terms, in 
order to maintain the production function 
in equilibrium, income per capita and capi-
tal per capita have to be constant, mean-
ing that both income and capital have to 
grow at the same rate as population. 
In a steady-state, investment which is 
required to assure capital for new workers 
and to replace already used capital is 
equal to the savings provided by the econ-
omy. The level of capital per worker de-
pends on investment, and the investment 
levels in turn depend on population growth 
and depreciation rate. If there is a popula-
tion growth, the capital-per-head and out-
put-per-head decrease, when investment is 
unchanged, though the aggregate output 
increases (Solow 1956:65–94).8 So far, the 
theory suggests that, other things equal, 
population growth will have a negative im-
pact on per-capita income. Empirical ob-
servation, for example of the case of Ger-
many’s unification, adds weight to this 
supposition. In fact, the unification nega-
tively affected output per capita (the most 
reliable indicator of economic wealth) in 
this country. However, the example of Ire-
land shows that population growth com-
bined with an appropriate structure of 
population is fruitful. Some models suggest 
that to maximize the long-term per-capita 
growth there has to be a population 
growth of 1-2 per cent per year, a saving 
rate 2-4 per cent and a discount rate be-
low 4 per cent (Simon 1977). Abstracting 
from other conditions, none of the coun-
tries, except Ireland, fulfils the proper re-
quirement of population growth (Figure 4). 
                                                 
8 The linkage is as follows: sy*=sf(k*)=(n+d)k, where 
s is saving, sy is saving per capita, k is capital, n 
is a constant rate of population growth, d is de-
preciation. 
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Does this mean then, with respect to the 
theory, that in the shrinking societies the 
standard of living will rise? In principle, 
yes it will, but only when the share of the 
active population remains unchanged. How-
ever, in reality the answer is no, since al-
most the entire EU is an ageing society; 
until 2020 the share of population aged 
65 and beyond is forecasted to increase in 
all analyzed countries. Only Ireland with 
the highest population-growth rates and 
total fertility rates in the EU stands out. 
The internal conditions found in Ireland 
are positive given its young society which 
in the future will be better prepared to 
carry the burden of pensions and extensive 
health care. Demographic projections indi-
cate also that the population of Slovakia, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic will re-
main constant. 
Therefore, in the case of almost all in-
dustrialized countries the issue of concern 
is not population decline itself but the age 
structure of society. An ageing society is 
already a problem, because with the grow-
ing numbers of older people, per-capita 
income tends to decrease. In other words, 
employment levels cannot be maintained 
because of too few people in labour force 
which ends up in a decline in output per 
capita. The situation in Sweden reflects the 
core of this problem. Until 2050 it will 
increase its old-age de-
pendency ratio9 from 
currently 29 per cent to 
45 per cent and its total 
dependency ratio10 from 
71 per cent to 85 per 
cent. Such changes will 
cause serious tensions 
within Swedish society, 
because of inequities that 
are now becoming more 
apparent. Moreover, be-
yond the growth aspect, 
there is a much more 
serious financial one: the 
ageing population causes 
significant financial im-
plications (lower spend-
ing, higher taxes and 
higher contributions). 
When it comes to the pension burden, 
some of the countries have decided to tie 
benefits more closely to contributions. Slo-
vakia and Hungary have decided to dele-
gate a part of social security pensions into 
schemes funded from private resources. In 
France and Portugal pension benefits are 
increasingly dependent upon the length of 
contribution rather than merely upon the 
age of the individual. Additionally, France 
has increased the number of contribution 
years required to receive a full pension as 
a response to growing life expectancies. 
Both these countries offer their citizens to 
be retired earlier or later, however with 
changes in the size of pension. In the same 
field, Poland and Sweden have implemented 
a direct linkage between the level of pen-
sion benefit received and the contributions 
paid during working life as well as the life 
expectancy of the population. Germany 
conducts the indexation of its public-
pension scheme which is dependent on the 
                                                 
9 Ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the 
population aged 20–64 (Eurostat, National projec-
tions, UN, World Population Prospects 1950–2050). 
10 Ratio of the sum of the population aged less 
than 20 and the population aged more than 65 to 
the population aged 20–64 (Eurostat, National pro-
jections, UN, World Population Prospects 1950–
2050). 
Figure 4 
GDP growth and population growth, 1995–2004 
(annual average growth rates) 
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Note: Polish data for population growth is from 2005. 
Source: Eurostat; EC; OECD: Productivity Database, September 2006. 
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relation between the number of employees 
and retirees (European Commission 2006).  
Table 3 
Total fertility rates 
 
  2000 2005 
Czech Republic 1.14 1.28 
Denmark 1.77 1.80 
Germany 1.38 1.36 
Hungary 1.32 1.32 
France 1.88 1.94 
Ireland 1.90 1.99 
Netherlands 1.72 1.73 
Poland 1.34 1.24 
Portugal 1.55 1.40 
Slovakia 1.30 1.25 
Sweden 1.54 1.77 
United Kingdom 1.64 1.80 
Source: OECD Country Statistical Profiles, Eurostat. 
 
Another issue that has lately given rise 
to a lot of concern is low fertility rates. 
The worse is the situation in the labour-
market, the lower is fertility rate. Such 
cause-effect linkages are the result of psy-
chological fear, which derive from a feel-
ing of insecurity. This linkage is marked in 
Slovakia, Poland and Portugal, but also in 
Germany. Changes in fertility rates are the 
result of the internal situation of a country 
but also of social mentalities. It is possible 
to stimulate the fertility rate through ap-
propriate policy. The Swedish example 
shows that in the 1980s the fertility rate 
rose (from 1.6 in 1984 to 2.1 in 1991) as 
the result of social reforms. However, be-
cause of the economic recession at the 
beginning of 1990s it has declined again to 
1.6 in 2001 (OECD 2003:23). 
2.3. Monetary policy and employ-
ment, and the case of EMU  
With their membership of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) all of the 
countries investigated have lost the flexibil-
ity of exchange rates, so they cannot use 
the currency devaluation to improve their 
competitiveness. As a result, other tools for 
adjustment have to be identified and ap-
plied in case of economic fluctuations. This, 
in turn, means that within the labour 
market more space for adjustments has to 
be provided (De Grauwe 2006:711–730). 
However, the question whether EMU has – 
or will have – a positive influence on the 
performance of the labour markets of its 
members still remains an open question. 
Among theoreticians both supporters and 
opponents of the statement that with EMU 
the employment situation of a country im-
proves can be identified (Belke and Gros 
2001:231–264). Some say that changes 
within flexible exchange rates are an ob-
stacle for investment and employment de-
velopment so that EMU implementation 
positively affects the economy and labour 
market (Mundell 1973). Others claim that 
the increase of price stability through EMU 
will be at the expense of greater volatility 
of output (Begg 2002:6). 
The crucial factor is the feasibility of 
goals. Since the European Central Bank 
pursues a goal of price stability as its con-
stitutional duty, only some particular coun-
tries – the non-members of EMU – can 
decide which goal should be given a 
greater priority: price stability or loss re-
duction in output and employment. Usually 
a tight monetary policy focused on price 
stability has to be adjusted by wage policy. 
Following this way of thinking, wage policy 
can lead to the recovery of labour markets 
(Auer 2000:42). According to Figure 5, it 
is notable that in 2005 almost all of the 
countries (except Hungary and Slovakia) 
decreased their inflation rates to or main-
tained them at a very low level (around 
2%), so that the goal of price stability has 
generally been fulfilled. Theoretically, in the 
short run, all countries with low inflation 
have at the same time higher unemploy-
ment rates. Attempts to explain the real 
relation between inflation and employment 
in the EU by using the Phillips curve (the 
lower inflation, the higher unemployment in 
the short run) fail, as the case of Ireland, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK 
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proves. These countries have found the 
“panacea” close to the ideal, combining 
relatively low unemployment rate with 
prices under control (Figure 5). The others 
lag far behind with respect to their unem-
ployment rates. In Poland, for example, 
this is a result of incoherent goals: while 
the National Bank of Poland looks after 
low inflation and stable currency, making 
economic growth of lesser importance in 
its work, the fiscal policy focuses on high 
GDP and low unemployment. This suggests 
that the degree of and the ability for pol-
icy coordination is critical for the overall 
result.  
The source of success in the countries 
investigated for labour-market performance 
is not EMU membership itself, as Table 4 
shows. So what kinds of factors regarding 
macroeconomic policy affect the employ-
ment results of these countries? 
 
Table 4 
EMU membership and labour-market results 
 
 EMU members Non-members 
Success IE, NL, PT DK, SE, UK 
Failure DE, FR CZ, SK, HU, PL 
 
As  highlighted above, in the case of 
EMU membership the labour market starts 
to fulfil the important role of an adjust-
ment tool, for example with reference to 
labour mobility or wage setting (CEC 
2002:11). So far France and Germany are 
not able to provide enough flexibility 
within their labour markets whilst at the 
same time they are unable to cope well 
with economic fluctuations. A 
look at labour mobility in 
Germany indicates that work-
ers are provided with high 
replacement ratios of unem-
ployment benefits, which 
makes them reluctant to join 
the labour force. The result 
is odd, as the case of the 
German construction industry 
proves: here, in the 1990s 
wages were higher than the 
respective earnings in the UK 
or Portugal. This translated 
into the inflow of British and 
Portuguese workers into Ger-
many in the 1900s, while the 
level of unemployment among 
German workers has in-
increased (Begg 2002:13). 
When wage setting is considered, the 
nominal wage flexibility is a crucial substi-
tute for monetary policy at the national 
level. However, in the national setting, the 
level where wage bargaining takes place is 
also important. Amongst the investigated 
countries, the process of wage setting has 
become more decentralized, with the sole 
exception of Portugal (Visser 2004:42–43). 
Wage bargaining remains at a sectoral 
level in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Germany and Slovakia. In the United King-
dom, the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary it dominates the company level. 
France oscillates in between, however, lately 
it has focused more on the company level. 
Ireland has preserved a system of wage 
bargaining at the intersectoral level 
(Schulten 2005: Table 4). Research results 
indicate that patterns of decentralization 
will become common within the whole 
European Union because of the imple-
mented reforms within the already existing 
wage-bargaining systems, and because of 
Figure 5 
Relation between the rate of unemployment and inflation, 2005 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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the increasing pressure from the employers’ 
side. 
Wage flexibility can be helpful in the 
new member-states on their way to the 
euro too. A characteristic feature of the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries is the fact that their nominal wages 
are rather inflexible. In the case of the 
Czech Republic, past experience of eco-
nomic crises indicates that, apart from 
wage rigidity, the most serious problems 
for the Czech labour market are stickiness 
and the upward tendency of unit labour 
costs. In Poland and Slovakia, the rigidity 
of wages may be overcome because 
changes within unemployment are well fol-
lowed by the changes in unit labour costs, 
despite the fact that the channels of ad-
justment are different. While the first 
country has linked its flexibility with pro-
ductivity growth, the latter has focused 
more on inflation (Radziwiłł, Walewski 
2006).  
One additional problem related to 
wages, beyond the need for bargaining at 
the national level and a preference for 
flexibility, is the fact that the infrastructure 
and framework for social and macroeco-
nomic dialogue has to be sufficiently devel-
oped to allow for wage changes in both 
directions (up and down) and to cope effi-
ciently with asymmetric shocks. As it can 
be noticed, the countries with the most 
successful labour markets already have a 
long tradition of social dialogue and mu-
tual cooperation between different levels of 
governance. Here the Netherlands stands 
out. Its Wassenaar Agreement (1982) as a 
social pact, and the Dutch Economic and 
Social Council (SER) and the Labour Foun-
dation (STAR) as institutions, support dia-
logue and provide social partnership. In 
Ireland, the Programme for National Re-
covery (1987) supported by the Irish Na-
tional Economic and Social Council and 
The Central Review Committee, plays a 
similar role. 
2.4. Fiscal policy and taxation 
In the period 1996–2005 only four of the 
12 countries analyzed met the EMU Con-
vergence Criteria for general government 
debt (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland 
and the UK). In the same time span, eight 
other countries differentiated their levels of 
government debt. While for some of the 
countries having the debt higher than 60 
per cent of GDP belongs to the past (DK, 
IE, SE, HU), for such countries like France 
and very lately Portugal and the Nether-
lands, it is a current issue of concern. 
Germany’s deteriorating debt position is a 
growing problem too. The country has met 
the indebtedness criterion only in 1996 and 
2001. Regarding the requirement of the 
government deficit, in the last 10 years 
only Sweden, Ireland and Denmark were 
able to stay below the level of 3 per cent 
of GDP. 
Despite the restrictions imposed by the 
Growth and Stability Pact, a helpful – al-
beit limited – space for manoeuvre has 
been left to deal with asymmetric shocks 
(the Brussels–Frankfurt Consensus), stimu-
late growth and activity of labour markets’ 
fiscal policy control. Labour-market revival 
or recession can be affected by properly 
implemented endogenous fiscal policy. The 
relation between fiscal policy and labour-
market performance is explained by the 
aggregate demand structure where gov-
ernment expenditure is central. At the be-
ginning of the 1990s, the Danish govern-
ment used this instrument in the form of 
higher government spending and tax cuts 
to recover from recession. Through the 
higher consumer spending, aggregate de-
mand has increased. To face the growing 
levels of consumption, business representa-
tives had to increase the level of invest-
ment, which further stimulated employ-
ment-level increases. It is a common prac-
tice to conduct looser fiscal policy during 
recession in order to maintain more de-
mand. However, it should not be forgotten 
  
16 
that in such situations an inflation threat 
exists. Through changes to the size or 
structure of expenditures, a particular 
country may stimulate its labour market. 
In this regard, good examples are offered 
by Denmark, Ireland and the UK, which 
seek to increase the productivity and em-
ployability of their labour force by increas-
ing government expenditure on education. 
Public finance need to be reformed espe-
cially in the case of Poland where the un-
favourable structure of expenditures and 
revenues is perceived as a restraining force 
for job creation and economic growth. 
Moreover, the result of its irrational pen-
sion system (for example, the KRUS11 and 
other special pension systems differentiated 
for particular groups) is a burden in the 
form of 17 per cent of GDP spent on so-
cial protection – more than in the other 
EU countries (Dolgowska, Hishow 2006).  
While fiscal spending is related to the 
demand side of the economy, taxation is 
related to the supply side and is of great 
importance too. In order to stimulate the 
economy, reforms in the following fields of 
taxation should be implemented: 
∗ decrease of high marginal tax rates on 
labour, production and investment, 
∗ reducing the level of distortions within 
the tax system. 
However, one should bear in mind that 
lower taxes can become a danger: firstly, 
because of the threat of tax competition; 
secondly because the role of welfare sys-
tems might be endangered; finally because, 
despite the decreasing taxes, public goods 
and social protection have to be financed 
anyway. That is why a plausible shift of 
the tax burden12 may occur, creating the 
risk of overtaxation of labour and under-
taxation of capital (CEPII April 2001:16). 
According to research based on general 
equilibrium models (CEPII April 2001), the 
cuts within particular taxes (social security 
                                                 
11 KRUS (pol. Kasa Rolniczego Ubezpieczenia Spolec-
znego), a complex system of social security for 
farmers, including pension schemes financed in the 
biggest share from government resources. 
12 Labour force is the least mobile of tax bases. 
contributions, personal income tax and 
corporate tax), affect the economic situa-
tion of the country–what further affects 
labour-market performance–differently, de-
pending on the size of the country, EMU 
membership and other factors. This is ap-
parently because: 
∗ any cut within the above-mentioned per-
sonal income tax and corporate tax 
leads to higher output in a country 
conducting reforms; however, it is often 
forgotten that there exists a risk of fis-
cal deficit, so finally these cuts have to 
be replaced by tax rises or expenditures 
cuts; 
∗ tax cuts in a large country negatively 
affect the economy of partner countries; 
∗ the level of impact on neighbouring 
economies depends on the reforming 
country’s membership of EMU;13 
∗ large countries are less sensitive to tax 
cuts, while the smaller/peripheral EU 
members might be seriously influenced 
by tax changes; 
∗ small countries are more eager to cut 
taxes than large countries;14 
∗ small countries gain more from a tax 
cut conducted alone than together with 
other countries.15 
Therefore, in the case of tax cuts, it is 
not only the level of cut that is detrimen-
tal, but also its timing and the geographi-
cal situation of the country conducting 
particular reforms. Moreover, taking all 
these aspects into consideration, the reason 
why tax harmonization is an issue of such 
great concern is clear: it is obvious that, 
because large countries are relatively indif-
ferent to tax cuts in other countries and 
because small countries gain less when they 
implement reforms at the same time as 
large countries, member-states have no real 
                                                 
13 If the reforming country is a member of EMU, 
the adjustment of the real exchange rate falls on 
prices (CEPII April 2001:7). In case of a non-
member country, nominal exchange rates depreciate 
relative to non-reforming countries. 
14 All Eastern European countries except Poland. 
15 Especially with the big ones like France or Ger-
many. 
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interest in harmonization. However, as ex-
amples of some big Eastern and Western 
European, not sufficiently open EU mem-
ber-states like Poland as well as France 
show, not implementing taxation reforms 
causes serious implications for the economy 
as a whole, because of suffering from tax 
reforms conducted by other large countries 
(Germany). 
To give some explanation but to retain 
the clear view of the topic, we will present 
countries of our focus in two dimensions 
of taxation reform: pro-labour and pro-
investment tax cuts. 
2.4.1. Pro-labour tax cuts 
As we have already mentioned, one wel-
come solution within a favourable tax re-
gime is the decline of marginal tax rates. 
This can push the economy towards pro-
growth performance. If conducted, it will 
stimulate investment and entrepreneurship 
in society. This usually depends upon the 
prevailing marginal tax rates.  
The OECD’s Taxing Wages 
Report shows that countries 
like Ireland, the UK, Portugal 
and the Netherlands, which 
have employment rates higher 
than 67 per cent, have a 
relatively low total tax 
wedge,16 which makes their 
citizens eager to work 
(OECD 29.03.2006:Table 1.2). 
Yet, Sweden with a higher 
(but already decreased) total 
tax wedge of 47.9 per cent 
(Figure 6) brings this linkage 
between low tax wedges and 
high employment into doubt. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden 
conducted a tax reform. The result was a 
reduction of the marginal tax rates that is 
                                                 
16 TW: the difference between the employees’ net 
pay and costs of being employed. Respectively: 25.7 
per cent; 33.5 per cent; 36.2 per cent; 38.6 per 
cent. 
perceived as a positive incentive to work, 
and may help to avoid the development of 
poverty traps.17 However, in this case, the 
high employment rate in the last 15 years 
is a result of overwhelmingly high employ-
ment in the public sector what corresponds 
with low input efficiency of this sector.18 
The real exception here is Slovakia where, 
despite a relatively low total tax wedge, 
the level of unemployment remains very 
high. 
Except in the case of Sweden, a de-
crease in total tax wedge in the period 
2000–2004 was also noticeable in Den-
mark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Portugal and the Slovak Republic. The 
Dutch government agreed to lower the tax 
wedge by 1.1 per cent. In 2006, it re-
duced the level of social transfers (it re-
stricted the length of time during which 
unemployment benefits can be drawn), 
which provided the opportunity to reduce 
labour-income tax. Slovakia has decreased 
its tax wedge significantly by 4.1 percent-
age points as a result of a cut in employ-
ers’ social-security contributions. Hungary 
has implemented labour-cost reductions for 
                                                 
17 It refers especially to unemployed or people 
whose main source of income are benefits. The 
higher the marginal tax rate is, the lower is the 
additional income from work. 
18 Lower than the UK, DE, FR and DK (European 
Central Bank). 
Figure 6
Current tax wedges in the EU 
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low-wage earners, which also caused a de-
cline in total tax wedge.19  
Reducing marginal taxation of labour is 
associated with smaller social-security con-
tributions. Lowering the level of social-
security contributions should be favourable 
for both employees (because the real wage 
inclines) and employers (because the real 
labour cost declines), so the result ought 
to be employment growth. Empirical evi-
dence highlights the fact that, with the in-
crease of production, firms need to create 
new production units by investing more in 
the short run (CEPII April 2001: 24), and 
these particular cuts support more labour-
intensive technology. Thus the new produc-
tion units are more labour-intensive than 
capital-intensive. That is why the use of the 
SSC cut as a tool to stimulate employment 
growth is more efficient than cuts in cor-
porate-income tax. 
Following these (often contested) consid-
erations, most of the investigated countries 
have reduced their social-security contribu-
tions. This should have had a positive in-
fluence on the labour market. Indeed, this 
is the case for Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. However, the cuts there re-
ferred only to particular labour groups 
like low-wage earners and self-employed. 
In the last few years Germany has not 
only reduced its levels of social-security 
contribution, but also of personal-income 
tax and corporate tax. All these changes 
to its tax regime should give similar results 
for the German economy – increase of la-
bour supply and labour demand, followed 
by employment rate and production growth 
– as they have for the other states. How-
ever, the increase in the employment rate 
between 1998 and 2005 was only 1.5 per-
centage point, what was mostly related to 
the increase in female employment at the 
expense of the decline in male employment. 
Additionally, the relatively large tax wedge 
(Figure 6) encourages people to avoid 
work. Similarly the “tax wedge obstacle” is 
perceptible in Hungary and France. What 
                                                 
19 OECD, Progress in Responding to the 2005 Pol-
icy Priorities: Country Notes. 
else, then, explains Germany’s high unem-
ployment rate beyond its tax wedge, which 
is the highest among the selected countries? 
One of the reasons for its poor economic 
and employment performance is the pres-
ervation of old structures: rigid labour 
law, high payroll load and, at the same 
time, low wage differentiation. However, 
the crucial factor in the case of Germany 
is its reunification. East Germany suffers 
from the weaknesses that characterized the 
GDR economy. East Germany’s adjustment 
difficulties are also the result of a too fast 
shift to West German conditions regarding 
wage, income level, social transfers and 
labour-market regulations (Walwei 2004), 
although ill-designed fiscal policy in the 
1990s has also been an obstacle (just as in 
the case of Poland, since it is ill-suited to 
dealing with external shocks). 
When it comes to France, is the poor 
performance regarding growth and em-
ployment the result of being a neighbour 
of Germany? If macro-econometric models 
assume that a large country like France is 
not sensitive to the tax cuts of small coun-
tries, is it experiencing asymmetric shocks 
as a result of an equivalent interdepend-
ence with Germany? The answer may lie in 
the fact that France is the biggest trade 
partner of Germany, both when exports 
and imports are considered20 (Federal Sta-
tistical Office, Germany), and its bilateral 
openness rate as percentage of GDP to-
wards Germany belongs to the highest.21 
One could put this statement in doubt be-
cause while the bilateral openness rate for 
Germany towards France is 2.6 per cent of 
GDP, the same indicator towards the UK is 
2.1 per cent of GDP. Why do difficulties 
and tax cuts in Germany affect more 
French than British economy? The answer 
has its roots in EMU membership: when 
there is a flexible exchange rate between 
the reforming country and its partners (as 
is the case for the UK), then the exchange 
                                                 
20 In 2005, imports amounted to 54.627 bn euros 
and exports to 79.87 bn. euros. 
21 Export of France to Germany as a percentage of 
France’s GDP is 3.1 per cent. Source: CHELEM-
CEPII. 
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rate can be used as an automatic stabilizer 
of the economic situation and helps cope 
with asymmetric shocks from the outside.  
Another tool that can be significant for 
pro-growth stimulation is personal income 
tax (PIT). The reduction of personal in-
come tax is the most favourable of the 
conditions created for employees/workers, 
because it increases post-tax wage rate 
(CEPII April 2001:25) and, if conducted, 
stimulates demand and output growth. But 
in the real world there is no clear-cut 
linkage between the level of PIT itself and 
the labour-market performance of a coun-
try (Figure 7). However, analysis of PIT 
helps understand the high level of taxes in 
such countries like Denmark, Sweden and 
the Netherlands. The acceptance of the 
Nordic and the Dutch societies for high 
tax levels is a result of a conscious choice, 
since citizens, who value more public 
goods and services, prefer an economic 
system where the level of taxation and 
public services is higher (Tiebout 1956). 
2.4.2. Pro-investment – the corporate 
income tax and taxation schemes 
As already mentioned, growth within in-
vestment directly contributes to economic 
growth. With the cut of corporate income 
tax (CIT) the profitability of companies in-
creases, which is mirrored by an increase 
in production and employment.22 Countries 
with a high level of corporate tax are less 
attractive for foreign investors (Djurović-
Todorović 2002:62). It is noticeable that 
countries like Ireland, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Portugal, where the inward 
flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
stocks is higher than outward flows, have 
lower rates of corporate tax than the oth-
ers (Figure 8). This would suggest that 
there has to be some kind of tax competi-
tion attracting FDI. EMU members have 
delegated their monetary policy to the ECB, 
so they are not able to use monetary pol-
icy as a tool of competition anymore. The 
role of this tool is partially replaced by 
competitive tax cuts and this is specially 
the case in Ireland and Portugal. The 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Po-
land are trying to give an incentive to 
their economies, through the profits flowing 
from FDI (output growth, employment 
growth). For example, Hungary 
has implemented changes in its 
tax-allowance scheme in the 
fields of research and develop-
ment (R&D). Meanwhile, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary are more attractive to 
foreign investors than Poland. 
The reason lies in Poland’s 
poor infrastructure and non-
entrepreneur-friendly environ-
ment, complicated procedures 
and excessive bureaucracy. Bet-
ter infrastructure, fiscal reform 
and proceeding privatization 
will all be helpful in Poland. 
However, it cannot be forgot-
ten that the CEE countries are 
increasingly facing competition from Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, Turkey or China in terms of 
                                                 
22 However, employment growth takes place to a 
lesser extent than by cut in SSC because additional 
production units are more capital intensive than 
labour intensive (the result of higher level of in-
vestment). The differentiation between the SSC cut 
and CIT cut is a result of the assumption that la-
bour and capital are not complementary. 
Figure 7 
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labour costs, corporate taxes, wage levels. 
This suggests that other factors have to be 
identified in order to attract investment 
(Podkaminer, Stehrer 2006:136). 
Other countries, not as successful as 
countries with net FDI, are working to 
promote investment and stimulate aggre-
gate demand. The Netherlands has reduced 
taxes for companies that decide to invest 
in R&D. Already at the beginning of 
1990s, Sweden conducted a tax cut on 
investment aiming at higher capital stock, 
higher employment and more economic 
growth. Moreover, research results point 
out that cuts in capital income tax fi-
nanced by an increase of the payroll tax 
will have a positive influence on the em-
ployment and growth rate (Michaelis, Birk 
2004:3). Since 1983, Denmark has been 
decreasing the rate of corporate income 
tax; however the level of revenues from 
VAT and payroll tax remained the same. 
Denmark is pursuing an entrepreneur-
friendly tax policy in order to stimulate 
employment and higher budget revenues. 
The success of any particular country 
also has its roots in taxation schemes. The 
full-exemption scheme23 and the partial-
                                                 
23 A mother company gains profits as long as the 
tax rates of the country where it has allocated its 
branch are lower than the tax rates in its home 
country. In this case the mother company is not 
obliged to pay corporate-income taxes in its home 
credit scheme24 allow 
corporations to avoid 
double taxation. In the 
countries with full-
exemption schemes25 the 
tax rate is a strong mo-
tivating factor for a 
company to change loca-
tion of its investment, 
since the higher the dif-
ference between tax 
rates in the foreign 
country (lower CIT) and 
the country of origin 
(higher CIT) the more 
profits it will gain. Con-
versely, this incentive 
does not exist in the 
partial-credit scheme implemented by Ire-
land and the UK. Here, the corporation 
does not take the CIT into consideration as 
long as its home country’s CIT rates are 
higher than those of the countries where it 
has allocated its investments. This explains 
to a great extent the net FDI inflow posi-
tion of the British and Irish towards the 
continental EU, where CIT levels are 
higher.26 
                                                                              
country from gains created by its daughter com-
pany allocated abroad. 
24 A mother company has to pay home tax rates 
anyway, so the profits made by its daughter com-
pany are taxed regarding the rules of the country 
of origin. 
25 Like France, Germany and the Netherlands. 
26 The second tax scheme has been adopted in 
Europe by the United Kingdom and Ireland, and by 
the United States and Japan elsewhere. Under such 
a scheme, the profit made by an affiliate is still 
taxed according to the rules in force in the given 
country. But when profits are repatriated, the 
mother firm is given a credit for taxes paid 
abroad, and has to pay taxes in the home country 
according to the domestic tax rules. Hence, under 
such a scheme, multinational firms are indifferent 
to tax differentials as long as the domestic rate is 
above the foreign one, since they will pay the home 
tax rate anyhow. They will only react to tax differ-
entials when the domestic tax rate is below the 
foreign one, because they are not refunded for 
excess taxes paid abroad (only partial-credit 
schemes are applied). Under such a scheme, the 
effect of tax competition is radically different to 
what happens with the exemption scheme, since the 
sensitivity of FDI to tax rebates abroad disappears 
(CEPII April 2001:50). 
Figure 8 
Adjusted top statutory tax rate on corporate income in per cent, 
2006 
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3) ADDITIONAL FACTORS 
AFFECTING LABOUR-MARKET 
PERFORMANCE 
3.1. Active labour-market measures 
Another factor that can bring a country 
closer to the level of full employment is an 
active labour-market policy (ALMP). Al-
though there is no relation between total 
labour-market policy’s spending as a per-
centage of GDP and the level of unem-
ployment as the examples of the UK or 
Germany show (Figure 9), the European 
Commission, basing its analysis on data 
from the period 1997–2002, claims that 
there is a linkage between ALMPs and 
employment rate increases (Employment in 
Europe 2004:Chapter 2). An increased in-
tensity in ALMP expenditures27 is said to 
be an explanation for employment growth 
rates of 10 per cent-20 per cent, however, 
data from the period 1998–2004 seem not 
to confirm this statement (Figure 10). For 
                                                 
27 ALMP spending as a percentage of GDP divided 
by the unemployment rate. 
example, Portugal, despite the increase of 
ALMPs spending intensity, has not under-
gone such a large change in employment 
rate as Ireland has; by contrast, the latter 
has decreased its intensity of ALMPs 
spending. 
The direct effect of the expansion of ac-
tive labour-market programmes is to in-
crease the number of those participating in 
them, which is followed by a decline in 
unemployment. Such gross effects might be 
reinforced by additional indirect effects, 
and this is the core of success. This suc-
cess can be further supported by proper 
institutional framework, social dialogue or 
other factors. However, some doubt the 
effectiveness of these active labour-market 
programmes, claiming that they are more 
a source of em-
ployment than a 
bridge to employ-
ment for partici-
pants of these pro-
grammes. They can 
be perceived, along 
with long-term sick 
leave or early 
retirement, as roots 
of hidden unem-
ployment (Karlsson 
2006). 
Research results 
point out that the 
labour-market suc-
cess of a particular 
country can also depend on (Höcker 
1998:191–214)  
∗ the structure of labour-market manage-
ment,  
∗ the system of industrial relations,  
∗ the general administrative structures.  
Countries that have decentralized their 
organization of labour administration per-
form better than those with centralized 
structures. Moreover, country specific in-
dustrial relations do influence the overall 
labour-market results too. For example, the 
representatives of Northern corporatism 
(Sweden, Denmark) or Anglo-Saxon plural-
Figure 9
Structure of public expenditures on LMP as a percentage of GDP, 2004 
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ism (Ireland, the UK) reach better results 
than the countries employing a Latin con-
frontation model (France). However, there 
are always exceptions. There is Portugal 
which belongs to the latter group but is 
not as much problematic. There is the 
Netherlands and Germany that, despite be-
ing numbered among the central social 
partnership models, have far different re-
sults in the labour market (Visser 2001). 
Finally, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hun-
gary and Poland, as transition economies, 
still grapple with relics from the past in 
the form of inefficient industries and post-
socialist mentality. In the case of Poland, 
the reason for poor performance is a neg-
ligence of the privatisation process, the 
structure of social security system and a 
large share of inefficient agriculture. 
3.2. Reforms 
Many of the implemented and ongoing re-
forms investigated here are crucial for bet-
ter labour-market performance. In order to 
increase the employability of workers, more 
skills and education has to be provided 
together with flexibility. While these issues 
are key goals of the British labour-market 
policy, they are secondary 
aims for Germany 
(Schmid, Roth 2006:8). 
This sheds light on the 
importance of goals and 
their meaning for labour-
market performance. 
Denmark’s success in in-
creasing parti-cipation is 
remarkable. The Danish 
seek solutions in active 
labour market measures 
(on-the-job training, edu-
cation) and these have 
indeed resulted in high 
employment. Similarly, the 
Netherlands has managed 
to limit long-term unem-
ployment to 1.9 per cent 
through the Melkert jobs 
offered to those who have been unem-
ployed longer than 12 months and through 
the increase in flexible forms of employ-
ment (like part-time or fixed-term employ-
ment).  
However, as the example of Ireland 
shows, there are always country-specific 
explanatory factors for success. Ireland, 
through the economic reforms conducted in 
the 1990s, limitation of bureaucracy and 
the opening of markets, has managed to 
transform itself from a country of medio-
cre performance, into one of the most dy-
namic economies in Europe. However, while 
the implemented reforms are the main fac-
tor of success, an important factor for the 
performance of this country are repatriants 
too. According to the Economic and Social 
Research Institute, Dublin, the return of 
repatriants means the return of high-
qualified people who earn 15 per cent 
more than the Irishmen who have never 
worked abroad. Moreover, in 2005, 11 per 
cent of all Irish start-ups with the highest 
efficiency were founded by repatriants.  
Against the backdrop of the EU diver-
sity, what is the position of the Central 
and Eastern European countries? Even a 
cursory analysis shows that Poland, Slova-
kia, the Czech Republic and Hungary have 
to conduct proper reforms in order to 
Figure 10 
Relation between changes in the intensity of ALMPs spending as a 
percentage of GDP and changes in employment rate (ER),  
1998–2004 
Note: there were no available data for PL, HU, SK and CZ. 
Source: Eurostat, OECD 
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narrow the gap between their own and 
West European incomes. Governments of 
these countries have to be aware, however, 
that a long-term vision is needed to main-
tain sustained output growth. As the ex-
ample of Poland shows, this country was 
able to implement a reform of its pension-
system scheme, which allowed for decreas-
ing the level of public expenditures on 
pensions (EC Forecast, 2004–2050). How-
ever, the positive results of this reform are 
constantly undermined by the existence of 
the KRUS pension system and the scheme 
of earlier retirement for miners. 
4) CONCLUSIONS 
Although it is impossible to give a single 
set of rules that could be helpful for im-
proving the labour-market performance of 
a country, it is possible to offer observa-
tions and recommendations. First of all, 
predominantly, smaller countries deal better 
with labour-market problems and achieve 
better results than larger countries. Be-
cause they are more dependent on sur-
roundings and external environment, they 
have to act in advance and to the higher 
extent. They do not have an innate advan-
tage though. As the examples of the Neth-
erlands, Ireland and Denmark show, it is 
possible to be small, dependent and have 
high employment rates at the same time. 
Secondly, the Central and Eastern European 
countries, and above all Poland and Slova-
kia are Europe’s laggards. The gap be-
tween the new member-states and the EU 
15 is going to deepen, if the new member-
states do not conduct efficient reforms 
within their fiscal policies, taxation systems, 
education system, etc. For CEE it is also 
crucial to complete the privatization proc-
ess and to implement entrepreneur-friendly 
environment, because low labour costs will 
soon loose importance as a decisive factor 
attracting foreign investors. The Central 
and Eastern European countries have to be 
more decisive when changes are consid-
ered, stop preserve relics from the past 
and try to conduct the best practices of 
other countries regarding labour-market 
solutions. Active labour-market programs in 
Denmark or Melkert jobs for long-term 
unemployed in the Netherlands should be 
taken into consideration. At the same time, 
the countries should treat the best practices 
of the partners only as a benchmark. In-
stead of mindless copying the solutions of 
other countries, the particular country 
ought to adjust the solutions so that to 
adapt them to its internal conditions. 
Furthermore, countries should focus 
themselves on decreasing the costs of la-
bour by reducing the level of tax wedge, 
although tax-wedge decline alone is not a 
receipt for success. It has to be supported 
by increasing the activity and employment 
rate of the society to better cope with the 
ageing phenomenon. Flexibility of wages is 
also of great importance, especially that 
most of the EU member-countries already 
did or are committed to join EMU. The 
countries that cannot overcome this weak-
ness will face serious problems with ad-
justment in case of appearance of asym-
metric shocks and being at the same time 
EMU members. It also looks as if countries 
that are more obliged to assure their citi-
zens a right to work than a right to in-
come and where the state is more a sup-
porter of employment and job creation 
than a provider of welfare – like in Den-
mark, Sweden, the UK and Ireland – deal 
better with difficulties in the labour mar-
ket. 
 
 
* * * * * 
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